Focusing on the Eagle's discussion of the principles of acoustics in lines
any case, what would the science of physics have looked like to an educated layman (such as Chaucer) in the second half of the fourteenth century? What models of the principles of sound were actually available to him? And are any of the choices that the Eagle makes among them significant for our understanding of the horizons of Chaucer's scientific knowledge?
In the course of attempting to answer these broad questions, I am going to propose a new source for one of the key moments in the Eagle's lecture on acoustics, the analogy with ripples created by a stone thrown into a body of water (in section III below). To be more precise, I will argue for the primary importance to this portion of The House of Fame of a source that is not exactly "new"-having long lurked at the fringes of Chaucerian scholarship's consciousness-but that has never been seriously considered as a decisive influence on the Eagle's analysis of sound. This source is the Wisdom-commentary of the Dominican friar Robert Holcot (c. 1290-1349). It seems to me that the probable presence of this text in Chaucer's mind at this point in The House of Fame invites a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which the English poet received-and used for literary effect-ideas about natural science. In section IV, I provide an account of the central, and perhaps even pivotal, position occupied by Holcot in the intellectual history of the fourteenth century. However, before even attempting to define Holcot's influence on the Eagle's acoustics, or to discuss the relevance of this to any assessment of Chaucer's indebtedness to fourteenth-century intellectual culture, it appears to me necessary to preface this with an account of what seem to be the prevailing assumptions about the sources of Chaucer's physics: in particular, the supposition that Chaucer's understanding of natural science is, in essence, so profoundly and conventionally "Aristotelian" as to leave little room for the identification of any distinctively fourteenth-century contributions in it (see section I). Such assumptions have been challenged before, with Chaucer's physics being portrayed as much more "cutting-edge" than is generally assumed, but only on the basis of arguments that have not been subjected to sufficient scrutiny (see section II). The possibility of Holcot's direct influence on the Eagle's account of the principles of acoustics is perhaps most significant for what it tells us about how Chaucer mediated between these alternatives-in effect pretending to participate in the grand and venerable tradition of scientific speculation about the natural world only by making use of 59 ideas that had already been given a distinct moral/rhetorical shape by a relatively near contemporary.
I. The "Aristotelian" Eagle?
It might be useful to begin with a summary of what the Eagle actually says: how, that is, he goes about attempting to justify his claim to authority as a natural scientist. Everything in the universe, the Eagle argues, is governed by a principle of attraction, such that every object has a natural tendency, a "kyndely enclynynge," to move toward a particular point: a "kyndely stede" (729-36). So, for example, anything made of a heavy substance such as stone or lead will always fall downward once it is released (737-41), and conversely, light things such as fire or sound or smoke naturally move upward, "seke upwarde on hight" (742-46). Similarly, every river is "enclyned" to run toward the sea; fish can only survive in water; and trees need to be rooted in the earth (747-52). What these instances illustrate, according to the Eagle, is the principle that every kind of thing has its own proper place in the universe: "every thinge, by thys reson, / Hath his propre mansyon / To which it seketh to repaire" (753-55); and he emphasizes that this is an opinion familiar in "every philosophres mouthe," not just Aristotle and Plato, but also "other clerkys, many oon" (757-60). Speech, moreover, is only a form of sound, and it is therefore governed by just the same rules that govern the behavior of sound in general. All sounds, the Eagle says, should be understood as disturbances in the air: as "eyre y-broken" (765). This includes speech (765-66), but the breaking of air can be effected "in many wise," so that the sounds made by pipes or harps, say, are very different (771-80). The movements of sound are analogous to the ripples on a body of water after a stone has been thrown into it (787-815). Just as ripples multiply in water, so too sound keeps on multiplying until, inevitably, it reaches the House of Fame (816-21). Since every thing is "enclyned" to move toward its proper place (its "kyndelych stede" ), and since the House of Fame is particularly capable of receiving sound (being "most conservatyf the soun" ), then the inevitable conclusion is that "every speche of every man" moves "kyndely to Fames place" (848-52). In other words, the eventual arrival of all tidings at the House of Fame is not at all so "impossible" as Chaucer's persona in the poem immediately assumes, 60 but a necessary deduction from some of the most basic principles of medieval physics.
Admittedly, there is at least an amusing tension between the sheer earnestness and elaboration of this long discussion of the physical properties of sound, and the strangeness of the circumstances in which it is imagined to take place. If nothing else, it is at least ironic that the limits of what is physically "impossible" are discussed so thoroughly in the course of a conversation with an enormous talking bird. Indeed, one might have expected the poet to have been a little more willing to believe in the Eagle's account of the wonders of the House of Fame, given that the Eagle himself presents such an impressive contradiction of the ordinary rules of possibility. Certainly, Chaucer actually goes out of his way to emphasize the comedy of this encounter between the bird and his own persona within the poem.
2 When the Eagle first addresses "Chaucer" it is only to complain about how uncomfortable he is to carry (573-74), which should presumably be taken as a joke at the expense of the poet's waistline. The narrator-figure himself is preoccupied with the concern that he may be on the point of being "stellifye[d]" (586): transformed into a star, that is, like so many figures in classical mythology (and in Ovid's Metamorphoses in particular). But this only suggests a rather exaggerated view of his own significance, as well as a degree of pusillanimity. Throughout his journey in the Eagle's claws, in fact, "Chaucer" cuts an amusingly self-centered, testy figure-altogether more Arthur Dent than Dante 3 -and it is perhaps implicit that his terse rejection of the Eagle's description of the wonders of the House of Fame is not so much a serious challenge to his guide's scientific authority as a convenient way of giving vent to his irritation at finding himself in the undignified position of being in the Eagle's claws in the first place. Yet, despite the comedy implicit in the exchanges between the bird and its passenger, the description of the physics of sound to which they lead seems to be anything but frivolous. The Eagle's account of the movements of sound is painstakingly thorough and exact. There is nothing intrinsically comical about the substance of what he says, despite the ironies created by its context. Indeed, it could be argued that those ironies are only deepened by the fact that the Eagle's speech is so determinedly sober. By his own estimation at least, what he has to say about 61 the physics of sound seems to amount to a rational and philosophically coherent account of the mechanisms of the natural world. Perhaps the best way of explaining the odd combination of weightiness and whimsy that characterizes the conversation between "Chaucer" and the Eagle is to see the Eagle's whole speech as an exercise in pastiche: that is, as a deliberately and playfully imitative use of an identifiably distinct mode of discourse for comical, but not necessarily satirical, effect. However, seeing the Eagle's speech in this way only intensifies the question of what particular discourses, cultural traditions, or "authorities" he might be said to be imitating. After all, pastiche is generally most effective when its mimicry is most accurate and wellinformed. If the Eagle is, in effect, pretending to be an expert in the physics of sound, what kind of expert exactly is he pretending to be? The Eagle himself suggests an answer to this question when he cites Aristotle, Plato, and "other clerkys, many oon" (759-60). Aristotle is explicitly the first of the authorities cited by the bird, and even though it is emphasized that Aristotle's opinions were shared by Plato and many other philosophers, it is certainly true that nearly all of the Eagle's ideas can be found in Aristotle's works. For example, the suggestion that "every thinge . . . / Hath his propre mansyon" (753-54) is apparently a version of Aristotle's analysis of "the locomotions of the elementary natural bodies-namely, fire, earth, and the like," in terms of a certain kind of "influence," whereby "each [element] is carried to its own place, if unhindered, the one up the other down."
4 Similarly, the observation that it is natural for heavy things to fall and light things to rise, or, as Chaucer puts it, "Lyght thinge upwarde, and dounwarde charge" (746), seems to be at least a distant recollection of Aristotle's view that all bodies "have a natural tendency towards a certain position: and this is 4 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, cap. 4, 208b (according to the standard system of references to Bekker's 1831 edition of Aristotle's works), trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. what it is to be light or heavy, the former being determined by an upward, the latter by a downward, tendency."
5 Meanwhile, the notion that sound is essentially broken air ("eyre y-broken"), so that the substance of sound is air itself ("in his substaunce ys but aire" [768]), clearly resembles Aristotle's definition of sound specifically in terms of impact: "[air] must be struck with a sudden sharp blow if it is to sound."
6 The Eagle's emphasis on the way in which sound produces movements of air ("And of thys movynge, out of doute, / Another ayre anoon ys meved" [812-13]) apparently corresponds with Aristotle's assertion that "What has the power of producing sound is what has the power of setting in movement a single mass of air which is continuous up to the point of hearing."
7 And even the Eagle's passing reference to the different kinds of sound produced by harps and pipes (771-79), and his comparison between them and human voices (780), have a precedent in Aristotle's careful distinction between the real, animate voice of a living creature and the metaphorical "voice" of a musical instrument.
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To a large extent, then, the authority to which the Eagle lays claim 5 Aristotle, Physics, VIII.4, 255b, trans. Hardie and Gaye, 427. In Plato's Timaeus, 52e-53a (trans. Lee and Johansen, 44), this tendency is explained in terms of a comparison with the process of winnowing: the things that were moved were constantly being separated and carried in different directions, rather like the contents of a winnowing basket or a similar implement for cleaning corn, in which the solid and heavy stuff is sifted out and settles on one side, the light and insubstantial on another. . . . It separated the kinds most unlike each other furthest away from each other and pushed those most like each other towards the same place, with the result that they came to occupy different regions of space even before they were arranged into an ordered universe. In Calcidius's commentary, this winnowing is defined as the process by which "ea quae massa erunt secernuntur, grana quidem seorsum motu et agitatione, palaeae uero aliorsum ex iactatione; et leuia quidem uolitare, grauia uero residere" (Timaeus, a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, ed. J. H. Waszink, in Plato latinus 4 [London: Warburg Institute, 1962], 344). In his study of the possible influence of Calcidius on Chaucer, Joseph E. Grennen picks out this last phrase ("leuia quidem uolitare, grauia uero residere"), and suggests that it is a "very apt translation of line 746" of is clearly Aristotle's, and it is theoretically possible that Chaucer did have some direct knowledge of the relevant parts of Aristotle's corpus, via the commentaries of the twelfth-century Arabic philosopher Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Latin translations of which had been available in Europe since the first of half of the thirteenth century. 9 However, it has long been something of a consensus among Chaucerian scholars that the principal sources for the Eagle's acoustics are most likely to lie in the work of three eminent Latin authorities to whom Chaucer makes conspicuous reference elsewhere. 10 These are: first, the fifth-century philosopher Macrobius, who appears as a distinct figure within The Parliament of Fowls (lines 120-70) and whose commentary on Cicero's Dream of Scipio is mentioned on three other occasions in Chaucer's works; 11 second, the sixth-century philosopher Boethius, the author not just of The Consolation of Philosophy, but also, and more significantly in this context, a treatise on music, to which Chaucer clearly alludes in The Nun's Priest's Tale (VII.3293-94); 12 and third, the thirteenth-century encyclopedist Vincent of Beauvais, whom Chaucer names directly in the G-prologue to The Legend of Good Women (line 307). 13 Nearly all of the "Aristotelian" motifs that I have listed can also be found in the work of these three men. 14 Boethius and Vincent of Beauvais also provide analogues for the one distinctive feature of the Eagle's speech for which no clear precedent or inspiration is readily available in Aristotle, and which effectively provides the center-piece of the Eagle's whole argument: that is, the proof "by experience" (788) of throwing a stone into a body of water and watching the ripples spread. 15 Either one of these writers could be Chaucer's immediate source for this conceit: the parallels are, in each case, Et debes scire quod sonus non fit in aere ita quod aer qui expellitur a percutiente movetur per se singulariter donec perveniat ad auditum, sed debes scire quod illud quod fit in aere de percussione corporum adinvicem est simile ei quod fit in aqua, quando lapis proiicitur in aquam, scilicet quia fit in aere apud percussionem figura sperica, aut prope spericam, cuius centrum est locus percussionis per expulsionem aeris ab illo loco equaliter, aut prope.
(Both of the references to the Speculum naturale in The Riverside Chaucer-"4.18 and 25.58"-are erroneous.)
claims himself to have known: that is, Macrobius, Boethius, and Vincent of Beauvais.
II. The "Cutting-Edge" Eagle?
The one thing that is troubling about this analysis is that it makes the Eagle's scientific horizons (and by extension, Chaucer's) seem so very old-fashioned. The implication is that Chaucer had no acquaintanceship with the remarkable scientific developments that had taken place in England since the middle of the thirteenth century, very often as a direct response to Aristotle's physics. This was a period that saw England (and Oxford in particular) develop a remarkable reputation for highly rigorous, innovative, and precise thinking about the workings of the universe. The possibility that Chaucer's thinking about the physics of sound could actually be more up to date than it might at first seem has been advocated most energetically by Joseph E. Grennen. 16 He defines the Eagle's speech as "a pastiche of terms and ideas drawn from contemporary scientific writing"; and he suggests, among other things, that it reflects the particular influence of Robert Grosseteste and Walter Burley. These claims are perhaps worth exploring more fully, in part because they imply that Chaucer's engagement with scientific thought was much deeper and more active than is usually assumed, and in part because they rely on correspondences of terminology and argument that are not easy to assess or interpret.
Grosseteste was not exactly a "contemporary" of Chaucer (he died in 1253), but he was a highly original thinker, in many ways at the cutting edge of scientific thinking in the thirteenth century, and he has at least a good claim to being the founding father of the English scientific tradition that I have just described. 17 Grosseteste wrote a set of Notes on Aristotle's Physics that seem to have been widely cited in Oxford well 16 into the fourteenth century, 18 as well as a whole series of short, and in some cases brilliantly innovative, works on specific questions in physics, including one on the generation of sounds.
19 As lector to the Franciscans in Oxford and then bishop of Lincoln, Grosseteste exerted a powerful influence on the intellectual development of the university. A. C. Crombie even claims that "Grosseteste's theory of science determined the approach of the next generations of Oxford natural philosophers to the physical world" and that "their work was in many ways simply an elaboration in concrete detail of his general principles of investigation and explanation." 20 This formulation possibly overstates the case, but there is no question that Grosseteste is a very important figure in the history of English science, and certainly important enough for Grennen's suggestion of a connection between Grosseteste and Chaucer to invite further scrutiny.
As it turns out, Grennen's evidence for Chaucer's direct knowledge of Grosseteste's writing is not very convincing. He argues that "the eagle's definition of sound in terms as 'noght but eyr ybroken' [765] is probably Chaucer's deliberately garbled version of a current explanation not of sound simpliciter but of the echo-a reversal of sound caused by a fractio radii at the obstacle with which it collides, on the analogy with the reflection of light." 21 This seems like an unnecessarily complex explanation of what the Eagle actually says, given that the idea of sound as "broken air" was relatively commonplace in the Middle Ages, and readily available to Chaucer in the work of Boethius, Macrobius, and Vincent of Beauvais (and probably elsewhere as well). Grennen also suggests that The House of Fame's reference to the air being "twyst with violence" (775) should be compared with a specific sentence from Grosseteste's commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, in which "the substance of sound" is defined as "light incorporated into the very finest air, [so that] when a sounding object is violently struck, parts of it are necessarily scattered from the natural position that they occupy throughout the sounding body." 22 Grosseteste's commentary on the Posterior Analytics seems to have become a relatively well-known text in medieval universities, but there is no particular reason for thinking that Chaucer would have made direct use of it himself; and the sentence to which Grennen points actually has little in common with The House of Fame except for its shared heritage in Aristotle. That both the Eagle and Grosseteste refer to "violence" in the context of sound is not very telling in itself, since the violence in question is specifically that of impact, and the emphasis on impact goes back to Aristotle (the "sudden sharp blow" from which sound is created). There is certainly no parallel in the Eagle's speech for what is the most distinctive aspect of Grosseteste's acoustics: the suggestion that the substance of sound is ultimately light-"light incorporated into the very finest air." 23 There are several problems, finally, with Grennen's insistence that the Eagle's reference to both a "demonstracion / In myn ymagynacion" (727-28) and a proof "by experience" (787-88) reflects "the fourteenth-century physicist's distinction between problems conceived secundum imaginationem ('thought experiments') and those worked out per experimentiam." This, he suggests (following Crombie), was Grosseteste's peculiar "contribution" to the history of European science. 24 Here he makes too casual a conflation between the language of fourteenth-century scientific writing and the particular terms of Grosseteste's own thinking, as if it would have been impossible to draw any distinction between imagination and experience in the fourteenth century without specific deference to what Crombie sees as Grosseteste's uniting of "the two twelfth-century traditions of technology and logic." Grennen also insists too narrowly on the connection between these two moments in the Eagle's speech-that is, the "demonstracion / In myn ymagynacion" and the proof "by experience"-as if they were necessarily to be read as opposing terms in a single contrast, even though they are actually separated by some sixty lines.
Grennen goes on to argue that "the most convincing proof . . . of Chaucer's familiarity with current speculation [in scientific thought]" is his apparent familiarity with Walter Burley's commentary on Aristotle's Physics. 25 Again, this would be a very significant connection-if it could be proved. Like Grosseteste, Burley is a very significant figure in the history of natural philosophy. He was a regular antagonist of William Ockham (who, like Burley, wrote on Aristotle's Physics); 26 and among the various issues on which Burley and Ockham disagreed was the way in which the quantity of motion inheres in any moving body. 27 It is perhaps worth emphasizing that Burley, like many thirteenth-and fourteenth-century English physicists, tended to subordinate questions on natural science to both theology and formal logic, in such a way as to make much of the "scientific thinking" in this period a dizzying mixture of the vastly philosophical and the narrowly terminological.
28 However, Burley's interest in physical questions, and in questions of motion in particular, is pronounced enough to mean that he is also sometimes seen as precursor to that group of extraordinarily brilliant English thinkers now known interchangeably as the Mertonians or the Oxford Calculators, whose particular contribution was the introduction, to this already heady mix of methodologies, of a large dose of mathematics. In this treatise, Bradwardine set out to remedy one of the most obvious defects in Aristotle's Physics, the lack of mathematical explanation of the principles governing acceleration and velocity, and it was this work (rather than Grosseteste's suite of short, speculative treatises on particular questions in physics) that seems to have set the dominant agenda for what was to develop into an extensive and distinctly Oxford-based tradition of work on the interrelationship among logic, physics, and mathematics, with a particular focus on problems in mechanics (i.e., on problems relating to forces and motions). This tradition includes work by such figures as William Heytesbury, John Dumbleton, Richard Kilvington, Richard Swineshead, and Roger Swineshead. Their achievements have been described as "a revolution in scientific thought,"
31 not just because of their treatment of the particular mechanical problems they chose to solve, but also because of the precedent they set for the use of mathematics in natural science. 32 In popular histories of science, 33 the Oxford Calculators are now sometimes given particular credit for having anticipated Galileo in the formulation of the mean speed theorem (which describes the distance covered in a specified time by a uniformly accelerated or decelerated body); 34 but perhaps what is most striking is that, for them, the mean speed theorem was, as Sylla puts it, merely "a fairly routine lemma":
35 that is, only a relatively basic premise preliminary to addressing problems that were in themselves much more complex. The existence of this tradition in Oxford certainly demonstrates that scientific thinking in the fourteenth century extended well beyond the astrology, alchemy, and magic that student-guides to Chaucer tend to represent as the sum-total of medieval science, 36 but also 32 Lindberg rightly comments that while "today the application of mathematics to motion needs no defense . . . it is only by hindsight and from a modern perspective that this conclusion is obvious; it would not have seemed plausible to many who worked within the Aristotelian tradition" (Beginnings, 299). 33 See, e.g., James Hannam, God's Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science (London: Icon, 2009), 175 ("they [the Mertonians] almost certainly beat out the path later followed by Galileo and the other founders of modern science"), and 178-80 (where the mean speed theorem is described as "the most significant result of fourteenth-century physics"). However, as Lindberg observes, "medieval physics was not a primitive version of modern physics and cannot be legitimately judged by comparison with its modern namesake" (Beginnings, 286 37 At the end of Troilus and Criseyde Chaucer submits the poem to the scrutiny of his learned friend Ralph Strode, who is probably to be identified with the logician who was a fellow of Merton College, like so many of the Calculators earlier in the century (including Walter Burley). 38 However, there is no indication that Strode himself had any particular interest in the kind of mechanical problems so characteristic of his predecessors at Merton; and the Nun's Priest invokes Bradwardine, not as the author of De proportionibus, but only as the author of the monumental philosophical treatise De causa Dei:
39 in other words, as a controversial theologian, rather than as a pioneer in the mathematization of physics. If it could be proved that Chaucer was directly acquainted with Burley's work on Aristotle's Physics, then it would be hard to deny that Chaucer would have been capable of appreciating this whole tradition of advanced scientific speculation.
Once again, however, Grennen's evidence for "Chaucer's familiarity with current speculation [in scientific thought]" turns out to be disappointingly thin; and the case he makes for Chaucer's knowledge of Burley's commentary on Aristotle's Physics is not, in itself, at all convincing. What Grennen argues, specifically, is that Chaucer's use of the word "conservatyf" (847) in the course of saying that the House of Fame is the place in the universe that best "conserves" sound was directly conditioned by Burley's use of the expression "virtutem conseruatiuam locati existentis" in the course of explicating Averroes's reading of Aristotle's fourth book of Physics. This phrase Grennen translates as "a power for conserving the placed thing." However, the passage in Burley's commentary from which Grennen cites this phrase is not nearly so relevant to the Eagle's concept of "kyndely place" (842) as Grennen suggests it is, since what is specifically at issue for Burley is how the "natural place" of each element ought to be defined in relation to the other elements, particularly in the light of Aristotle's proposition that "the place of a thing is the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it."
40 Burley is principally concerned here with Averroes's rejection of what might look like an obvious deduction from Aristotle's proposition: i.e., that if "the place of a thing is the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it," then the "natural place" of earth is therefore the "innermost motionless boundary" of the element that is naturally adjacent to it. But this deduction would be obviously wrong in a number of ways, as Averroes and Burley emphasize:
Certum est quod terra non moueretur ad superficiem aque ibi existentem, et propter hoc superficies aque non est locus naturalis per se ipsius terre, et hec est intentio Commentatoris commento .24. [recte .42.] huius capituli, ubi dicit quod "graue querit hunc finem [nisi] secundum quod est medium totius, et non secundum quod est finis aque. Et si non esset ita, tunc terra moveretur ad aquam ubicunque fuerit finis eius, sicut ferrum mouetur ad magnetem ubicunque fuerit. Sed hoc non sentit[ur] de aqua" 41 -hec Commentator. Dico igitur quod ultimum aque non est per se locus naturalis terre, nec eadem ratione est ultimum aeris locus naturalis aque.
[Certainly, earth is not attracted only so far as the surface of any water happening to be there, and therefore the surface of the water is not the "natural place" of earth in and of itself: this is what the Commentator means to say in his 24th {recte 42nd} comment on this chapter, where he says that "a heavy thing seeks this boundary {between earth and water}, not just to the extent that it seeks to reach the boundary of the water, but rather to the extent that it seeks to reach the middle of the whole. And if this were not the case, then earth would always be attracted to {the surface of} the water wherever it happened to be, just as iron is attracted to a magnet where it happens to be, but this is found not to be the case with water"-such {are the words of} the Commentator. I say, therefore, that the surface of water is not in itself the "natural place" of earth, nor by the same reason is the boundary with air the "natural place" of water.] 42 In effect, what Averroes and Burley argue is that, even if earth is always attracted downward such that it always passes through water until it reaches at least the boundary between earth and water, this does not mean that it is solely and particularly to this boundary that earth is attracted.
It is only in the course of trying to explicate this very technical point that Burley introduces what is, in effect, a distinction between two different ways of conceiving of the elements' attraction to their "natural place." It is not just that each element is drawn away from the other elements in such a way that it is always trying to reach at least the limits of the space occupied by any of the others. His point is that it is also drawn to its own proper sphere, in such a way that this elemental attraction always operates, regardless of the nature of each element's boundaries with the other elements:
Et si queratur quis igitur est locus naturalis terre per se, loquendo de loco locante et circumscribente, dico quod locus naturalis per se ipsius terre est ultimum aque secundum quod aqua est in tali situ, et in tali distantia ad orbem. Locus enim naturalis plus dic [o] 43 quam ultimum corporis continentis, quia ultra ultimum corporis continentis, addit virtutem conseruatiuam locati existentis in corpore locante; et ideo si aer esset in loco totius aque, ultimum aeris esset locus naturalis terre, quia aer existens in tali situ, haberet virtutem conseruandi terram.
(fol. 106ra)
[And if it were asked what therefore is the "natural place" of earth in itself, I would say that the "natural place" in which earth is located and circumscribed, in and of itself, is the boundary with water {only} to the extent that water is in 42 Walter Burley, commentary on Aristotle's Physics (Venice: Johannes Herbort, 1482), fol. 117v; (Venice: Simon de Luere, 1501; facsimile repr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1972), fol. 106ra.
43 dico] dicit (in both the 1482 and 1501 editions) 75 that particular position and at some distance from the sphere {of earth itself}. I refer to "natural place" 44 rather than the boundary of a containing body {i.e., to the nature of attractive forces, rather than to Aristotle's conceptualization of extension in space}, since beyond the boundary of the containing body, this additionally confers the conserving power of an existing location {"virtutem conseruatiuam locati existentis"}. This means that, if the place of the water were wholly taken by air, the "natural place" of earth would then be the boundary of air, since air existing in that particular place would have the power to keep earth in position.]
It looks as if Burley may have been particularly indebted here to Saint Thomas Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's Physics:
Videmus enim quod unumquodque horum fertur in suum proprium locum quando non impeditur, grave quidem deorsum, leve autem sursum. Ex quo patet quod locus habet quandam virtutem conservandi locatum: et propter hoc locatum tendit in suum locum desiderio suae conservationis. Non autem ex hoc ostenditur quod locus habeat virtutem attractivam, nisi sicut finis dicitur attrahere.
[For we observe that each of these bodies is carried to its proper place when it is not prevented, i.e., the heavy are carried down and the light upward. This shows that place has a certain power of conserving what is in place. For this reason, an object tends to its own place by the desire to conserve itself. This, however, does not prove that place has the power to attract, except in the sense in which the end is said to attract.] 45 Aquinas's "virtus conservandi locatum" (power of conserving what is placed) is simpler and more immediately comprehensible than Burley's "virtus conservativa locati existentis" ("conserving power of an existing location"), and it may well be that Burley's phrasing here should be interpreted merely as a version of Aquinas's formulation. Whether or not this is the case, it is clearly part of a relatively involved philosophical discussion, and the point it is designed to make is very specific to this discussion. It is difficult to see how Chaucer's Eagle's suggestion that 44 Grennen translates: "non-natural place." He seems to have misexpanded the abbreviation for "enim," wrongly reading "non." 45 
III. Ripples on the Water
So far, then, my argument has been rather negative and inconclusive: I have simply observed that thirteenth-and fourteenth-century English physics seems to be conspicuous only by its absence from the Eagle's account of the mechanics of sound; and I have contested Grennen's suggestion that English physics is nevertheless visible in the Eagle's speech in the form of identifiable references to Grosseteste and Burley. However, I do not think that we are obliged to choose between assuming either that Chaucer's knowledge of physics was wholly oldfashioned-to the extent that he had no awareness of any writer on the subject more recent than Vincent of Beauvais-or that he must have had a direct and detailed acquaintance with the work of highly sophisticated thinkers such as Grosseteste and Burley. I will argue that Chaucer's approach to the themes of the Eagle's speech is decisively shaped by another writer who can be shown to have links with Grosseteste, Burley, and the Oxford Calculators-but who is hardly an innovative thinker on physics himself. I will also suggest that not only did this fourteenth-century writer provide Chaucer with several themes and metaphors of a broadly "scientific" kind: he also showed him how perspectives on physics could be used to effect even in contexts that are otherwise predominantly moral or allegorical. The writer I have in mind is Robert Holcot, the Dominican friar best known for his widely circulated commentary on the deutero-canonical book of Wisdom. 46 The 
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[Aristotle explains the natural origins of this "Echo" in the second book of On the Soul: {see also} the corresponding commentary, distinction 8 {recte 80}, for according to the Commentator {i.e., Averroes} Echo is "the repetition of sound in such a way as to conserve its shape," and it is made out of air that has been struck and that resounds when it is reflected towards any obstacle that is as concave as possible. Indeed, in relation to this Aristotle suggests an analogy with light. 54 Light that is multiplied in air and thrown onto any polished surface is reflected back toward the point at which it is generated, just as is evident in the case of a luminous body that is illuminated not only by rays {of light} striking directly, but also by rays that are reflected: otherwise there would be shadow wherever the rays of the sun do not strike.] It is at this point in his discussion of the physics of sound that Holcot introduces the analogy with the ripples created on the surface of a body of water by a falling object: Averroes makes use of this same analogy in the chapter immediately before the one that Holcot cites; 62 and it may well be that Holcot's own use of this analogy was most directly prompted by Averroes, rather than Boethius or Vincent of Beauvais, 63 neither of whom he mentions at this point.
In order to describe the effect of the stone falling into the water Holcot repeatedly uses the terms "circulationes" and "circulus," and The House of Fame could be taken to reflect this in its use of the word "sercle" at lines 791, 794, and 796. Vincent of Beauvais likewise makes repeated use of the word "circulus," but only in relation to sound in general, not when describing the spread of ripples as such. Even more striking, however, is the fact that Holcot specifically says that each of these circular ripples causes ("causat") the next one, since "cause" seems to have been a key-term in this context for Chaucer too. Neither Boethius, Vincent of Beauvais, nor Averroes refers specifically to "cause" in relation to the ripples created by a stone falling into water, whereas Chaucer's Eagle uses the term three times in quick succession (at lines 794, 796, and 800). Holcot also seems to have provided Chaucer with another term that is very prominent in the Eagle's speech: that is, "multiplication" (which appears at lines 784, 801, and 820). 64 Again, there is no precedent for this in Boethius, Vincent, or Averroes; however, Holcot says: "In the same way [as in the case of the ripples on the water], when sound is created in the air by the impact of something on something else, then that sound is multiplied, and it generates another sound, and this other sound generates another sound [and so on], radiating outwards, as long 62 Averroes, Commentarium magnum, 419b, ed. Crawford, 248 (cited above, note 49). 63 67 circulariter, quamdiu durat virtus primi percutientis") (Lection 193: V, fol. 164rb; O, fol. 286va; emphasis mine). Holcot's particular emphasis on both "cause" and "multiplication" in his account of the ripples on the water seems to be the immediate explanation for the Eagle's prominent repetition of these very terms in the course of his own use of this analogy (which I cite here with these key words in bold):
Now, hennes-forth y wol the teche How every speche or noyse or soun, Thurgh hys multiplicacioun, Thogh hyt were piped of a mouse, Mote nede come to Fames house. I preve hyt thus (take hede now) By experience-for yf that thow Throwe on water now a stoon, Wel wost thou, hyt wol make anoon A litel roundell, as a serclePeraventure brode as a covercleAnd ryght anoon thow shalt see wel, That sercle wol cause another whele And that the thridde, and so forth, brother, Every sercle causynge other, Wydder than hym self was. And thus, fro roundel to compas, Eche aboute other goynge, Causeth of othres sterynge, And multiplyinge ever moo, Til that hyt be so fer y-goo That hyt at bothe brynkes bee. These parallels are suggestive in themselves, and they clearly indicate that, even if Chaucer were aware of the use of the ripples-on-the-water analogy by Boethius, Vincent of Beauvais, or Averroes, it is probably Holcot whose influence on Chaucer at this point was most direct. Yet it is perhaps the broader context in which Holcot discusses the physics of sound that is most suggestive about the nature of the relationship between the two English writers. Holcot's discussion of the nature of sound in the Wisdom-commentary comes as part of his analysis of "Echo," which, he emphasizes, is open to discussion from at least two distinct perspectives, the one "natural" ("naturale," or what might be called "scientific") and the other "fabulous" ("fabulosum," i.e., derived from classical mythology): "Circa generationem Echo notanda 68 sunt duo: vnum est naturale, aliud fabulosum" (Lection 193: V, fol. 164ra; O, fol. 286rb). Having offered us his account of the "natural" approach to the theme of echoes (by means of the analogy with the ripples on the water), Holcot then switches directly to the "fabulous": [In mythological terms, Ovid tells the story of Echo in the third book of Metamorphoses. There was once a young woman of wonderful eloquence, who was accustomed to detain Juno with long drawn-out storytelling all the time that Jupiter was in the mountains committing adultery with his girlfriends. In this way Juno was prevented by the stories of this Echo from being able to catch any of these girls, for they fled from her while she was being detained by Echo's stories. "That tongue of thine {she said}, by which I have been {deceived} shall have its power curtailed and enjoy the briefest use of speech." Juno deprived Echo of the power of speech leaving her only the power to repeat the ends of words. So then this Echo fell in love with the beautiful Narcissus, but was rejected by him. "Thus spurned, she lurks in the woods, hides her shamed face among the foliage, and lives from that time on in lonely caves." In this way exhausted by love, grief, and shame, her whole body vanished {into thin air} apart from her voice and bones. 82 Her bones were changed into rocks, and at length only her voice remained, which is what we call "Echo."]
In essence, what Holcot does here is to yoke together precisely the same two modes of thinking that come together to such incongruous effect in the Eagle's speech in The House of Fame: that is, the "naturale" and the "fabulosum"-the "scientific" and the "mythological." Just as Holcot chooses to read Echo both as a phenomenon in nature and as an invitation to analyze the moral dimensions of the classical legend of Echo, so too Chaucer presents us with the Eagle, who is simultaneously both a vehicle for what seems to be a determinedly scientific account of the mechanics of sound and a figure straight out of classical mythology. 83 the particular analogy of the ripples on the water, but also for the explicit conjunction of "mythology" with "science." [{Ovid} chooses to say that the House of Envy is situated in a valley {"in vallibus"} 86 because of the way that lesser folk envy their superiors; and every envious person is envious because he sees himself to be inferior to another in something that he desires. A lesser planet eclipses a greater, not vice versa, just as is clear with regard to the sun and the moon: and so it regularly happens that those who are worth less, and are inferior in their virtues and their merits, strive to overshadow their betters through envy.]
Here again we find that seemingly incongruous conjunction between the "fabulosum" and the "naturale": between the imaginative world of classical literature, that is, and the physical world of bodies moving in the cosmos. As it happens, Chaucer's description of the House of Fame's nearby annex, the House of Rumour, also includes the idea that it was situated in a valley ("Tho saugh I stond in a valeye, / Under the castel, fast by, / An house" ), and it is possible that Chaucer was particularly encouraged to include this detail by its prominence in Holcot's discussion of Ovid's allegorical architecture, as well as-or possibly even wholly instead of-Ovid's own text. Just as Holcot here uses the idea of movement of planets in eclipses in order to explain the architecture of a particular ethical/mythical construct (the House of Envy), so too, it could be argued, Chaucer uses the idea of the physical movements of sound-waves in order to explain the architecture of what is, in effect, a parallel and related concept (the House of Fame). ab aetate tenera magistrorum et scholarium ac diversarum artium professorum quos ingenii perspicacitas ac doctrinae celebritas clariores effecerant, relegato quolibet partiali favore, exquisitissima sollicitudine nostrae semper coniunximus comitivae, quorum consolativis colloquiis confortati, nunc argumentorum ostensivis investigationibus, nunc physicorum processuum ac catholicorum doctorum tractatuum recitationibus, nunc moralitatum excitativis collationibus, velut alternatis et multiplicatis ingenii ferculis, dulcius fovebamur.
IV. The Place of Robert Holcot in
[From our early years we attached to our society with the most exquisite solicitude and discarding all partiality all such masters and scholars and professors in the several faculties as had become most distinguished by their subtlety of mind and the fame of their learning. Deriving consolation from their sympathetic conversation, we were delightfully entertained, now by demonstrative chains of reasoning, now by the recital of the physical processes and the treatises of the doctors of the Church, now by stimulating discourses on the allegorical meaning of things as by a rich and well-varied intellectual feast.] 91 The recital of the "physical processes" (physicum processuum) mentioned here might even be read as a direct reference to something very like the scientifically educational lecture that Chaucer's Eagle attempts to provide; while the moralitatum excitative collationes (literally, "stimulating assemblages of moral ideas") clearly imply a reference to some form of allegory, as E. C. Thomas's translation assumes ("stimulating discourses on the allegorical meaning of things").
While Holcot is very likely to have known Burley personally (as a fellow member of the Bury circle), the evidence is also very strong that he knew at least some of Grosseteste's work. Apart from anything else, he says that he did. He refers directly to Grosseteste as "Linconiensis" [In response to this argument others say differently: {they say} that one multitude can be more than another; and they concede that there have been more revolutions of the moon than of the sun. They also say that just as the ratio between a cube and a square is three to two, so the ratio between an infinite cube and an infinite square is {still} three to two: and {therefore} there can be addition to an infinite. And this was the opinion of {the bishop} of Lincoln {in his commentary} on the books of
Physics.]
According to Pierre Duhem: "The last assertion seems completely false: Robert Grosseteste says nothing not purely Aristotelian on the subject of the infinite in his Summa (which is so concise, so full of ideas), and nothing in for the leading part he plays in two other important fourteenth-century contexts. 95 First, he is generally regarded as one of the principal theological antagonists of Thomas Bradwardine: specifically, as one of the philosophers that Bradwardine chose to represent in De causa Dei as "Pelagians" (that is, philosophical skeptics in the tradition of Ockham), and against whom the De causa Dei was apparently directed. 96 For Bradwardine, whose views on the relationship between divine grace and human free will could certainly be said to veer toward theological determinism, Holcot seems to have been something of a bête noire, since, even by the standards of Ockham's followers, Holcot's skepticism was particularly strongly stated. 97 In his Sentences-commentary he even argued for the rather disconcerting proposition that God can lie and deceive, and that he can do so without impairing his perfection in any way.
98 Such antideterminism may well have appealed rather strongly to Chaucer, the poet who includes in Book IV of Troilus and Criseyde an extended illustration of the folly of narrow fatalism. 99 Second, Holcot is known for his membership of a group that Beryl Smalley long ago labeled as the "classicizing friars": a group of English writers characterized by a conspicuous penchant for incorporating classical material into what were essentially devotional and pastoral texts. Smalley considered Holcot the most "diversely gifted" of all these fraternal writers: and indeed, "no medieval moralist," she adds, "ever had a stronger sense of humour" than Holcot did. 100 The Wisdom-commentary is an undeniably engaging and accessible text, as well as an instructive one, which means that it is not hard to see why it eventually became, in Jenny Swanson's words, "one of the most popular commentaries of the late middle ages." 101 As Swanson explains, it "made [Holcot's] name famous throughout medieval Europe, and surviving catalogues show that every well-stocked library came to have a copy." 102 Nevertheless, the book's popularity waned in the sixteenth century; and the Wisdomcommentary is now (arguably) the most widely circulated and culturally significant medieval English text never to have appeared in a complete modern edition.
V. Holcot and Chaucer
The possibility that Chaucer was a reader of Holcot's Wisdom-commentary has, in fact, long been recognized. Some of the strongest evidence for it comes from the fact that Chaucer's discussion of dreams and their significance in The Nun's Priest's Tale seems to have been substantially influenced by several passages in the Wisdom-commentary. Both of the stories told by the cock Chauntecleer in support of the idea that dreams can be predictive of the future are found in the commentary (Lections 102 and 201); 103 and it was probably directly from Holcot that Chaucer
Chaucer's knowledge of Holcot by pointing out that the friar's influence is probably directly visible in the rather austere attitude that Chaucer takes in the Canterbury Tales toward parental, and particularly paternal, responsibility. So, for example, there is a close correspondence between Chaucer's Physician's warning that parents should be careful not to encourage immorality in their children either "by ensample of youre lyvynge / Or by youre necligence in chastisynge" (PhyT, 97-98) and Holcot's assertion in Lection 41 that when children turn out to be immoral it is either "Tum propter parentum imitationem, tum propter defectum castigationis" (either because of imitating their parents, or a lack of chastisement). 106 It is also the case that in The Merchant's Tale January's assertion that a man ought to "Take . . . a wyf with greet devocioun, / By cause of leveful procreacioun / Of children to th'onour of God above" (MerT, 1447-49) at least resembles the phrasing of Holcot's argument in Lection 37 that the generation of children should occur within the boundaries of marriage "in order to honour God" ("prolis propagatio ad laudem Dei"). 107 A further close verbal correspondence can be found in the two writers' accounts of the story of Phaethon. Chaucer concludes his version by asking:
Loo, ys it not a mochil myschaunce To lat a fool han governaunce Of thing that he can not demeyne?
(HF, 957-59)
The particular phrasing of this rhetorical question seems to be a direct reflection of Holcot's observation in Lection 8 of the Wisdomcommentary that "This is what might happen to those fools and presumptuous people who complain about divine governance" ("Ita contingeret de istis fatuis et presumptuosis qui de diuina gubernatione murmurant"; my italics). 108 However, the case for Chaucer's dependence on Holcot rests not just on close verbal correspondences such as these, but also on the sheer accumulation of themes and motifs common to the two writers. So, for example, in 540-53) . 110 In these cases, the verbal correspondences are not so close as to add much weight individually to the idea that Chaucer was making use of the Wisdomcommentary, but cumulatively they support the impression that, intellectually and imaginatively, the two writers inhabited very much the same world.
In the light of all this, the most efficient explanation for the parallels between Chaucer's use of the ripples-on-the-water analogy and Holcot's use of this same analogy is surely that Chaucer knew the Wisdomcommentary, and that he used it in the composition of the Eagle's speech. Indeed, many of the general principles of the Eagle's physics are at least implicit in Holcot's commentary; 111 and there is probably no need to assume that Chaucer's learning (either in classical literature or in fourteenth-century physics) necessarily extended very much beyond it. It may be that Chaucerian scholars have actually played into the poet's hands by attempting to identify his sources only in authorities much grander and more remote than the English friar. No doubt Chaucer would have been quite pleased to be credited with such deep erudition that he would have needed no guide to the thinking of such ancient intellectual eminences as Aristotle or Boethius. 112 However, in the Wisdom-commentary he would certainly have found just such a guide. It would have provided him with a convenient and engagingly presented digest of themes and motifs gathered from a wide range of different sources, which probably did much more to define his intellectual horizons than he would have liked to admit. At the same time, it could be argued that Chaucer's greatest debt to Holcot lies not so much in his adoption of any particular themes or motifs, as in what he learned from him about how to exploit them for literary effect: that is, in Holcot's demonstration of the very possibilities implicit in learned eclecticism as a kind of literary practice. What Holcot showed Chaucer, in particular, was how it might be possible to generate intellectual energy and a sense of abundance from the inventive juxtaposition of distinctly different kinds of authority. For Holcot, demonstrative eclecticism was a means of attracting and keeping the attention of his readers, and also of showing those readers (most of them, implicitly, clerks) how they too might attract and maintain the attention of their own congregations when they came to write sermons or lectures in their turn: but it also seems to be something of an end in itself, a challenge to his ingenuity and intellectual flamboyance at least as much as it was a means of exhibiting the breadth of his reading. It is perhaps in a very similar spirit that Chaucer incorporates his own displays of demonstrative, compilatorish bookishness into his poetry-as, for example, here in the Eagle's speech in The House of Fame, but also recurrently throughout his work. [For wisdom is more active than all active things: and reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity. For she is a vapor of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the glory of the almighty God: and therefore no defiled thing cometh into her. . . . Indeed, this was the reasoning of Master Alexander Nequam: that in every created body, no matter how small, human reason can perceive the infinite power of God, his infinite wisdom and goodness. This is illustrated, for example, by the atom. Human reason readily sees and accepts that the productive power of anything can be measured as an amount equivalent to the proportion of {the value of} what is produced to {the value of} what it is produced with. The extent to which {the value of} the actual product exceeds {the value of} what it is produced with is an index of the agent's effective power. Therefore, since it is reasonable to assume that an atom is something {produced} from nothing, and that, if the atom exceeds {what it is produced with}, then it exceeds nothing to an infinite extent, so the conclusion must be that the power required to call into being {even} an atom out of nothing is infinite. Second, reason will see that since an atom has a body, it must have within itself three intersecting lines at right angles {i.e., it is three-dimensional}. With the compasses placed at this point, a sphere can be drawn around this atom, and {reason} sees that within the sphere an infinite number of circles can be drawn; indeed an infinite number of bodies are imaginable within the sphere, and moreover, within these circles every shape drawable can be placed (but the number of these is infinite); and on this might be rested an infinite number of proofs, in relation both to magnitudes and to numbers. Thus human reason will see even in a flower or an atom the infinity of knowledge objectively depicted. Indeed, the infinity of knowledge could not be described by any agent, except that of infinite wisdom.
Therefore, human reason (as long as it is good) will see and discover in even a single atom the infinite wisdom of the Creator.]
Grossesteste, Dictum 60 124
Videbit enim racio investigans, quod omnis potencia mensuratur per proporcionem facti ad illud ex quo fit. Tanta est enim facientis potencia, quanto factum excedit illud ex quo fit. Omne autem aliquid, quantumcumque vile et parvum, [in] 125 infinitum excedit nichilum. Igitur, cum racio invenerit attomum esse aliquid ex nichilo, et decurrerit ab eo ad potenciam facientis, mensuraveritque eam per proporcionem facti ad illud ex quo fit, videbit attomum egressum in esse non a minori quam ab infinita potencia. Sic igitur egressus attomi in esse aliquid ex nichilo similacrum est infinite potencie efficientis.
Item, racio eadem considerans amplius inveniet attomum esse corpus, et in eo tres lineas intersecantes se ad angulos rectos, in qua sectione posito pede circino 126 describi 127 poterit sphera 128 intra attomum, et in sphera infinitos circulos et omnia corpora sphere inscriptibilia, et in circulis omnes figuras inscriptabiles circulis, que sunt infinite. Videbitque racio quod supra quamlibet illarum infinitarum figurarum potest erigi sciencia demonstrativa. Invenietque in attomo descripcionem infinite sciencie, non solum de magnitudinibus, sed eciam de numeris. Cum igitur invenerit racio attomum factum ex nichilo ab infinita potencia, videritque in attomo descripcionem infinite sciencie, perpendet eandem [Inquiring reason will see that power can be measured as a proportion of the {value of the work} done to the means by which it is done. For the power of any agent equals the extent to which what is done exceeds that by which it is done. Every single thing, however, no matter how wretched and small, exceeds nothing to any infinite extent. Therefore when reason discovers an atom to be something {created} out of nothing, and it proceeds from this to the power of its producer, and, measuring it as a proportion of what is done to the means by which it is done, it will see that an atom could only emerge into being as a result of a power that is nothing less than infinite. Thus the emergence of an atom into being something out of nothing is a model of the infinite power of its producer.
Likewise, consideration by reason will discover that an atom is a body, and that within it there are three lines intersecting at right angles. With the foot of the compasses placed at this point, a sphere can be drawn within the atom, and inside the sphere an infinite number of circles and all the bodies of the sphere that can be drawn, and in the circles every shape that can be drawn in circles, and the number of these is infinite.
Reason will see that any one of these innumerable shapes will support a demonstrable {understanding of} knowledge. And it will discover in the atom a description of infinite knowledge, as regards not just magnitudes, but also numbers. Since therefore reason will have found that {even} an atom made out of nothing requires infinite power, and sees in an atom a description of infinite knowledge, it might consider the very description of that same infinite knowledge by means of an atom as itself amounting to infinite knowledge. But infinite knowledge could not be described except by infinite wisdom. Reason will therefore see that the atom has been created by infinite power {only} by means of infinite wisdom.]
